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THE LUGANO CASE IN THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE: EVOLVING EUROPEAN
UNION COMPETENCE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ronald A. Brand
On October 19, 2004, the European Court of Justice held its first en banc
hearing since the 2004 enlargement to twenty-five Member States. The case
was Opinion 1/03, involving a request by the Council of the European Union on
whether the Community has exclusive or shared competence to conclude the
Lugano Convention. While the case on its face deals only with a single convention, it has far broader implications and is likely to influence the development
of private international law and private law on a Community level for years to
come. In this brief article, I hope to trace the origins of the issues faced in the
Lugano case and comment on some of its implications for the future.
The original Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community
recognized that in order to have effective free movement of goods, services,
capital, and persons, it was also necessary to have free movement ofjudgments
and arbitral awards. After all, the ultimate test of the existence of a right is the
ability to reduce that right, as against others, to a form that is both recognized
and enforced by the legal system. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which
addresses this issue in its Full Faith and Credit Clause,' the original Rome
Treaty provided in its Article 220 that the Member States of the Community
should "enter into [further] negotiations with each other with a view to securing
for the benefit of their nationals... [including among others] the simplification
of formalities governing the reciprocal, recognition and
enforcement of judg'2
ments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.
The six original Member States carried out this dictate by negotiating the
Brussels Convention,' a treaty that was both narrower and broader than the
objectives of Article 220. Due to the existence of the New York Convention

*

Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Legal Education, University of

Pittsburgh. This article is a revised version of oral remarks presented at the International Law Weekend 2004,
held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October 20 to 22, 2004.
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
2.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 293 (ex Art. 220)
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 art. 293 [hereinafter TEC].
3.
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(consolidated version), Sept. 27, 1968, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
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covering arbitration,4 the Brussels Convention was limited to court judgments
and did not have to cover arbitration. It also was limited to "civil and commercial" matters, thus avoiding a broader scope that would have been consistent
with Article 220. On the other hand, as to judgments, the Convention is not
limited to recognition and enforcement. The original Member States realized
the importance of jurisdiction to questions of judgment recognition. They
negotiated a "double convention" that included rules of direct jurisdiction for
the originating court, as well as rules of recognition and enforcement for the
court addressed in the second instance, for purposes of gaining the effect of the
judgment.' The Brussels Convention thus did much more than provide the equivalent of a Full Faith and Credit clause for Europe; it harmonized jurisdictional
rules and provided specific protection for defendants domiciled in other
Member States from otherwise "exorbitant" jurisdictional bases. In this
respect, it added the equivalent of the U.S. Due Process Clause as it has been
applied to jurisdictional issues!
As each new Member State joined the European Community, it acceded
to the Brussels Convention as a part of its package of obligations.8 As the Community was broadened, it was also deepened, and in the area of private international law the Treaty of Amsterdam added language to the European
Community Treaty that moved competence from the Member States to the
Community Institutions. As part of the establishment of "an area of freedom,
security and justice," Article 61 of the Treaty now provides that "the Council
shall adopt... measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters as
provided for in Article 65." 9 Article 65 in turn, describes the scope of such
authority as follows:

4.

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, entered intoforce

June 7, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].

The text of the Convention, and

information on its status, are available on the UNCITRAL website at http://www.uncitral.org/en-main.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
5.
Single (sometimes referred to as "simple") conventions on the recognition ofjudgments deal
only with indirect jurisdiction and apply only to the decision of the court asked to enforce a foreign judgment.
The recognizing court considers the jurisdiction of the court issuing a judgment in deciding whether to
recognize the judgment of the originating court. Double conventions, like the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions, not only deal with recognition, but also provide direct jurisdiction rules applicable in the court
in which the case is first brought - thus addressing the matter from the outset and preempting the need for
substantial indirect consideration of the issuing court's jurisdiction by the court asked to recognize the
resulting judgment.
6.
See Brussels Convention, supra note 4, art. 3.
7.
For a discussion of the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses
to issues of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts, see Ronald A. Brand, Due Process,Jurisdictionanda Hague
Judgments Convention, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 661 (1999).
8.
See Brussels Convention, supra note 4.
9.
TEC, supra note 3, art. 61.
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Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having
cross-border implications, to be taken in accordance with Article 67
and insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal
market, shall include:
a) Improving and simplifying: the system for cross-border service
of judicial and extrajudicial documents; cooperation in the
taking of evidence; the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including decisions in
extrajudicial cases;
b) Promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the
Member States concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction;
Eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedc)
ings, ifnecessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on
civil procedure applicable in the Member States.'"

The Community institutions have not hesitated to exercise this authority.
The Council has adopted regulations dealing with:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Insolvency proceedings;"I
Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments
in family law matters; 2
Service of process; 3
Taking of evidence; 4 and
Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments
in civil and commercial matters. 5

Proposals for further instruments continue to be considered. 6 Each of
these instruments adds to the set of rules now applicable to internal Community
TEC, supra note 3, art. 65.
10.
11.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J.
(L 160) 1.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
12.
and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children
of Both Spouses, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 19 [hereinafter Brussels HI].
Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the Service in the Member States
13.
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 37.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on Cooperation Between the Courts
14.
of the Member States in the Taking of Evidence in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1.
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
15.
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 [hereinafter Brussels
I] (The Brussels Convention remains in force for relations between Denmark and the other Member States).
see
65,
under Article
agenda
on the
information
further
16.
For
http://europa.eu.int/conn/justicehome/fsj/civil/fsj_civil intro._en.htm (visited Oct. 8, 2004).
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legal matters. They combine with several treaties to provide the current private
international law framework within the European Union. Those treaties include
the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 7 and the
Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters. 8
While these instruments clearly have brought about change regarding the
source of law applicable to private law and private international law issues in
the courts of the Member States of the European Union, they are on their face
limited for the most part to litigation that is internal to the Union. While the
rules of the Brussels Regulation would apply to a case brought by a U.S.
national against a French domiciliary in a French court, they would not apply
in courts outside the European Union. Those rules reflect exercise of competence for matters relating, as required by Article 65, to "the proper functioning
of the internal market."' 9 This leaves open the question of authority for the
adoption of such rules for purposes of external relations.
The question of external competence in the area ofjudicial cooperation has
surfaced in several ways. One is at the Hague Conference on Private International Law, where since 1992 the Hague Member States have considered the
possibility of a multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement ofjudgments in civil and commercial matters.2 0 The Hague negotiations have evolved from full participation by European Union Member States
to full coordination of a Community position represented in the Hague Special
Commissions by the European Commission and Council on behalf of the
Community. This has not occurred, however, without some tension in regard
to the appropriateness of this representation. There has been no clear statement
as to whether the competence for such matters now rests with the European
Union Member States; with the Community institutions; or in a mixed form
with Member States and Community institutions each having competence for
some, but not all issues.
17.
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, openedforsignatureJune
19, 1980, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 [hereinafter Rome ]. On July 22, 2003, the European Commission submitted
its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to noncontractual obligations. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
Applicable to Non-Contratual Obligations, COM(03)0427 final [hereinafter Rome II]. This would effectively
extend the rules of Rome I to non-contractual obligations, thus giving the package of applicable law rules
coverage more consistent with the scope of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Regulation. Id.
18.
European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter
Lugano Convention].
19.
TEC, supra note 3, art. 65.
20.
Information on the Hague Conference project may be found at Hague Conference on Private
International Law: Works in Progress, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index.en.php?act=progress.listing&cat=4 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005).
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Another setting in which the issue of Community competence for external
relations in matters of judicial cooperation has surfaced, is found in the effort
to adopt amendments to the Lugano Convention that are consistent with the
changes made when the Brussels Convention was replaced with the Brussels I
Regulation. In this setting, however, there has been a further step in the process
with the Council having asked the European Court of Justice for an opinion
under Article 300(6) of the European Community Treaty,2 on whether the
Community "has exclusive or shared competence to conclude the new Lugano
Convention."
Citing the 1971 ERTA decision of the European Court of Justice,22 the
Council's Legal Service rendered an opinion on February 5, 1999, that:
once the Community has exercised its internal competences adopting
positions by which common rules are fixed [pursuant to Article 65],
the Community competence becomes exclusive, in the sense that the
Member States lose the right to contract, individually and even
collectively, obligations with third countries which affect the said
rules.23
The ERTA doctrine was further developed by the Court in its Open Skies
judgment of 2002,24 when it stated:
TEC, supra note 3, art. 300(6)
The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible
with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is
adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the
Treaty on European Union.
22.
Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European
Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263 (1971) [hereinafterERTA].
23.
Alegria Borris, The Effect of the Adoption of Brussels I and Rome I on the External
Competences of the EC and the Member States 2 (copy on file with the author). The Legal Service was
paraphrasing the ERTA judgment at 1 17 and 18, which stated:
17
In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a common
policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the right acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect
those rules.
18
As and when such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in
a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations towards third countries
affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community legal system.
24.
Case C-467-98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9519; Case C-468/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9575; Case C-469/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Finland, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9627; Case C-471/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingodm of Belgium, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9681; Case 472/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
21.
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81 It must next be determined under what circumstances the scope
of the common rules may be affected or distorted by the international
commitments at issue and, therefore, under what circumstances the
Community acquires an external competence by reason of the
exercise of its internal competence.
82 According to the Court's case-law, that is the case where the
international commitments fall within the scope of the common rules
(AETRjudgment, paragraph 30), or in any event within an area which
is already largely covered by such rules (Opinion 2/91, paragraph 25).
In the latter case, the Court has held that Member States may not
enter into international commitments outside the framework of the
Community institutions, even if there is no contradiction between
those commitments and the common rules (Opinion 2/91, paragraphs
25 and 26).
83 Thus it is that, whenever the Community has included in its
internal legislative acts provisions relating to the treatment of
nationals ofnon-member countries or expressly conferred on its institutions powers to negotiate with non-member countries, it acquires an
exclusive external competence in the spheres covered by those acts
(Opinion 1/94, paragraph 95; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33).
84 The same applies, even in the absence of any express provision
authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries,
where the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a
given area, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected
within the meaning of the AETR judgment if the Member States
retained freedom to negotiate with non-member countries (Opinion
1/94, paragraph 96; Opinion 2/92, paragraph 33).
Commentators have argued that these decisions do not indicate clear
exclusive Community competence in areas of private international law and judicial cooperation because a doctrine lay down in "purely economic areas such as
external trade," may not apply evenly to private international law.25
From this side of the Atlantic, the ERTA line of cases is particularly
interesting. The idea that powers emanating from constitutional documents-in
this case the treaties creating the European Community-that grant specific
authority for internal matters, without granting specific authority for external
matters, can be exercised internally and thus result in the capture of external
authority is an intriguing one. This clearly is seen as both fundamental and

2002 E.C.R. 1-9741; Case C-475/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, 2002
E.C.R. 1-9797; Case C-476/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany,
2002 E.C.R. 1-9855.
25.
See, Borris, supra note 23, at 2.
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necessary to the evolution of the law of the European Community. At the same
time, this concept demonstrates the tension between the Member States and the
Community institutions as the deepening of the Community moves forward. In
the Lugano case, it also demonstrates the capture by international trade lawyers
within the Community institutions of authority in the realm of private international law; something the private international law experts seem never to have
been consulted upon when the Treaty of Amsterdam was concluded and
competence was moved to the Community institutions.
The outcome of the Lugano case will have significance beyond just determining who should sign the amended Lugano Convention. It is likely to
suggest, as well, the answer to who represents the Community and its Member
States in negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private International Law and
other multilateral bodies.26 Whether the European Court of Justice finds any
important distinction between prior cases in the international economic law
realm and these matters in the field of private international law will say a lot
about the evolution of the European Community from a simple common market
to the more complex type of law-making framework that makes it look moreand-more like a federal system.

26.
The allocation of competence may have implications as well for negotiations in the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the Institute for Unification of
International Private Law (UNIDRO1T).

